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Abstract
Exam failures of the students in a specific network may influence not only the fu-
ture performance of the student but also all students from their friendship networks,
affecting the overall cohort’s performance. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how
the whole network responses to failure. The difficulty of such analysis is incorpo-
rated in the probability of the failures being highly endogenous. In this paper, I am
applying the novel identification and estimation approach to deal with such endo-
geneity. I am exploring the dynamic data on the students’ networks in HSE, Nizhniy
Novgorod. The results suggest that, on average, the exam failure of the friend have
a negative effect on future performance.
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1 Introduction
The peer effect on behaviour and performance is widely studied in the literature across
many fields, and its importance is well understood. However, spillover effects of shock-
ing events, such as exam failures, through the network are rarely analyzed. Such events
occurring to one or several network members will not only influence themselves but will
potentially have an effect on the future outcomes of their peers. Network links, hence,
can be viewed as the channels transferring the shock from one person to the others. I
look at the dynamic network of university students linked by friendship ties to analyse
the possible connection between the exam failures and the future educational outcomes
of peers. In case of existence of such spillover effects of the failures, they may have bigger
consequences for the university performanve as well.
Students who have to retake exams, or potentially having to drop out of university
completely, may feel under intense pressure and this can result in lower productivity
(see, for example Baumeister (1984) or Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010)). Deter-
mining how these shocks influence the behaviour of students and their friends can help
to better understand the dynamics of network performance. In addition, understand-
ing more about the influence on all students’ behaviour of such shocks may also help
universities to adjust their strategy in establishing a threshold for passing the classes.
Very selective university may relax the threshold for passing the courses, if the failure
negatively affects too many students. A large proportion of university dropouts is the
result of the class passing policies created by the universities - policies which can be
controlled. In some institutions of higher education, most of the dropouts are directly
affected by the failures of the exams.
I use data from the Higher School of Economics, where three exam failures during the
same term will lead to the expulsion of the student1. However, in some institutions of
higher education, students who fail exams may remain in the study program and repeat
1Each academic year consists of 2 terms, each includes 2 modules.
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the failed courses under individual study plan, but the probability of leaving the uni-
versity before graduation for such students will be higher than for the students without
failed exam. Dropouts are viewed as an important problem for the universities since
they create sunk costs. For example, costs of the university dropouts in Germany were
estimated at $11.5 billion in 2007, Stifterverband (2007). In Australia they are $1.36
billion, according to the report of Adams and Banks (2010). Therefore, understanding
the influence the failed exam may have on future student performance may allow for
possible university level policy improvements. This could reduce sunk costs and adjust
the performance for an optimum outcome.
Following standard argument of peer effect literature (Manski (1993)), other things
equal, two students with the same abilities influence their peers’ performance in a sim-
ilar way. These two students have equal chances of failing their exams. However, for
these similar students, the failure will be determined by a unobserved random compo-
nent (error term). If one of the students passes the exam and the other fails it, they
should affect the behaviour and performance of the peers differently. The failure of the
exam is endogenous in the university context, since the probability of the failure may
also depend on the network’s performance. The logic is similar to standard peer effect in
education suggesting the comovement of outcomes (Jackson (2010)). The student with
worse performing friends are more likely to fail the exam than the student with better
performing friends. The endogeneity does not allow identification of the effect of the
failure on the friends’ future performance with the tools used in the peer effect liter-
ature. To overcome this problem, I use an approach suggested in Marchenko (2018)2.
It uses the difference between failing and passing the exam for similar students being
determined by unobserved random component. The predicted probability of failing the
exam for two similar students, according to the peer effect argument, should be the
same. Therefore, the above mentioned unobserved random component is the one that
2Please check the latest version at sites.google.com/site/mariavmarchenko/endshocks.pdf
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defines the effect of the failure on the friends’ future performance and, moreover, it is
exogenous, which eliminates the problem of endogeneity of the failure.
I address the question of failures in the university by studying the sample of students
from one cohort at the National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Nizh-
niy Novgorod campus, a highly selective university in Russia. The data consist of two
waves and include self-reported friendship links to the classmates as well as the informa-
tion about all the grades of the students and some additional individual information. I
consider the exam failures during the first year of studies as something that will be one
of the determinants of the changes in the friends’ grades in the second year. I assune,
that the network reported at the end of the first year influences the probability of expe-
riencing the exam failure during the first year. Additionally, these links will transfer the
shock to affect the performance of the friends in the next period. The students’ networks
change between two surveys, and the new network from the second year influences the
performance in the second period. Moreover, the new links are crucial for comparing
the outcomes with and without influence of the failure. The network is defined by the
self-reported links from the two waves of the survey at the end of the study year.
Although I do not examine the direct peer effect in this paper, I use the general
framework of peer effects literature and its methodological fundamentals of the model
introduced by Manski (1993). The direct peer effect is usually considered as instanta-
neous, whereas the shocking event can have a deferred effect. It will have an influence
on the network only in the period after the shock happens and is revealed to the peers.
The instantaneous and dynamic component of the network’s influence on individual out-
comes should be distinguished: the former is due to the direct peer effect, the latter is
related to the spillovers from shocking events.
In general, the shock’s influence is ambiguous. Although the unexpected shock may
serve as a wake-up call to some students and could motivate them to be more focused on
their studies, for others, the negative influence may dominate. First of all, the connec-
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tions between students can be extremely close. The student may reduce the amount of
time spent on personal studies due to the shared activities outside of the university with
the friend who failed. Alternatively, the stress experienced after observing the friends
failing may be so high, that it will negatively affect future performance.One or another
direction may dominate depending on characteristics of the sample and institutional
environment. Therefore, it is important to empirically examine the effect of the exam
failures in order to determine the direction of the effect for the particular setting. The
paper finds the negative effect of the exam failures on the future outcomes of the peers,
which suggests that the stress or tightness of the connections effects are prevailing in
the setting under consideration.
I focus on first-year failures only. In the first year, students are more likely to fail
due to lack of ability or because of difficulties adjusting to the new environment. The
first exams may appear to be too difficult for some of the students despite the student
having gained entrance to the university in the first place. Therefore, the effect of the
exam failure of the friends relates to the misconception of peers’ abilities.
This paper relies on the model and identification results proposed by Marchenko
(2018). The identification requires, firstly, the existence of friends of friends that are
not connected to the student. Hence, the friends of friends do not affect the student
directly, but via the common friend only. It is not necessary that each student has such
link structure, but it is enough that part of the network satisfy this requirement. Sec-
ondly, the identification demands longitudinal network variation with the existence of
some network variation not caused by the exam failure. Changes in the network allow for
a comparison of the influence of old and new peer group on the outcome. The presence
of new friends and absence of old ones creates variation in the peer group characteristics,
moreover, only old links are transferring the failure, and this helps to identify the effect
of the failure. However, it is important that some changes in the network are driven
solely by a natural adjustment in the social environment, i.e. friends reveal different
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interests. Certainly, some of the links might be broken due to exam retakes and friends
dropouts. However, the natural variation of the network is a valid assumption for the
students’ network setting, which I am proving later in the paper. The links formed in
the first year are highly likely to be revised due to the gradual unveiling of the friends’
personal characteristics. Of course, this natural variation suggests the endogenous link
formation during the second period, which does not allow the correct identification of
the second year peer effects, but does not affect the identification of the shock. This is
formally proved in Marchenko (2018).
I discuss the model without link formation process and, therefore, it analyses only the
direct effect of the shock, although the shock might also affect the changes in perfor-
mance indirectly by influencing the network.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3
describes the institutional environment of the education system in Russia and the data
used. Section 4 discusses the proposed model, states the identifying assumptions and
proposes the estimation method for the model. Section 5 discusses the network char-
acteristics and identifying assumptions. Section 6 provides the estimation results and
evidence of the influence of dropouts and retakes on peers. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
I contribute to the literature by studying changes in peer behaviour and achievement
in response to an individual shock. I look at the exam failures, which might result in the
dropouts from the university, and provide an evidence of the shock transferring through
the network.
The influence of social connections on the student’s performance, primarily on their
academic achievements, is being widely studied in the literature. Coleman (1966) sug-
gests that the social environment of the students is influencing their individual achieve-
ments. Manski (1993) introduced the three effects playing the role in determining the
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individual outcomes in presence of social connections: exogenous effect, endogenous ef-
fect, and correlated effect. The endogenous effect explains how individual outcomes will
be affected by the average outcomes of their peer group and it is the most important
effect to identify and estimate as it may have policy implications. The identification of
such effect, in the case of group interactions, requires an additional source of exogenous
variation. One strand of empirical literature uses the exogenous group formation as the
source of exogenous variation. For example, Lyle (2007), Lyle (2009) and Carrell et al.,
2009 find peer effect by looking at the military institutions framework. The groups in the
US Military academy are formed administratively and the syllabi are predetermined, so
the students are interacting closely inside of their group. In the university context, the
endogenous group formation due to the free choice of the study courses is more common,
however, there are several examples, where the compulsory courses and exogenous group
formation allow to study the peer effect for the whole group. For example, De Giorgi
et al. (2010) study the sample of students at Bocconi University, who take nine com-
pulsory courses during the first three semesters and who are randomly assigned to the
study groups. The exogenous group formation helps to find the peer effect in the choice
of major. Androushchak et al. (2013) examine the influence of the ability of students on
the achievements of classmates at the university under consideration.
When study groups are formed endogenously, the random assignment of dorm mates
may help to obtain the necessary exogenous variation. For example, Sacerdote (2001)
looks at the sample of roommates at Dartmouth, who are randomly assigned at the be-
ginning of their studies. The estimation of the endogenous peer effect as an effect of an
average group performance has been criticized. The whole group is not likely to affect
the student equally. Additional assumptions on the structure or the ranking inside the
peer group or exact links are preferable for better estimation of peer effect, although
social network data is not always available.
Use of social network data requires other identifying assumptions that restrict the
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network. It can be more fruitful in comparison to the group interaction since more in-
formation is available about the network structure. Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) prove the
identification of the peer effect in social networks under rather mild assumptions. The
network should include intransitive triads, i.e. two members of the network connected
via the third person. They apply the identification results to the Add Health database
of high school students in the USA. This identification result used broadly in network
effects analysis. Poldin et al. (2016) apply this result to a cohort of third-year students,
similar to the dataset used in this paper.
The effect of the shock on the future outcome of the network is less studied, however,
such questions are gaining more popularity. Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) discusses
the indirect effect of cash transfers, Graham (2008) analyses the changes of school perfor-
mance in response to the class size changes using group interactions. Dieye et al. (2014)
explore scholarship programs in Colombia based on the network data. Comola and Prina
(2014) also use the network data to explore the effect of a shock and is the first to use
the network observed in dynamics, developing the dynamic peer effect model, similar to
the one proposed in Marchenko (2018) and used in this paper. However, all focus on
the randomized treatment as a shock, therefore, they are not facing the endogeneity of
the shock problem. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to analyse the indirect
effect of endogenous shocks through the network.
Unlike the academic achievements of the students, the academic failures are not stud-
ied that widely in the framework of the social environment. Tinto (1975) asserts that the
institutional and social environment of a university is believed to affects the academic
failures of the students. However, recent economic literature analysing the dropouts is
limited, for example, Li et al. (2013), Goux et al. (2014) and some others. Dropouts and
failures are more widely discussed from the point of view of psychology or sociology, see
Rumberger (2011). I fill an existing gap in the literature, studying the spread of the
effect of the exam failures further in the network.
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3 Data and Descriptive analysis
The data in this paper a from a survey of one cohort of students in the National
Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE further in the text), Nizhny
Novgorod campus. I first discuss shortly characteristics of the Russian higher education
system and of the HSE.
3.1 The system of higher education in Russia and specifics of the sampled
university.
Individuals with completed full vocational education or completed professional ed-
ucation of non-university level are eligible to enter the university.Most of the places
in the state universities are financed by the government: around 65%3, but it differs
among institutions. For example, the university analysed in this paper provided 340
state-financed places out of total 431 in 20124. The tuition fee varies from institution to
institution, in our example, it varies between 130000 and 165000 Rubles per year, which
equals to 28-36 times the minimum monthly wage or 18-23 times the minimum cost of
living in Russia.
Students are accepted to the universities depending on the scores of the obligatory
standardized examination, Unified School Examination, conducted at the end of the last
school year. Each high school graduate has to take exams in several subjects: Mathe-
matics and Russian are mandatory to graduate from the school, the other subjects are
chosen by the graduates depending on their preferences and the requirements of the uni-
versities they are aiming to apply to. For example, economic department of NRU-HSE
requires the USE results in Social Studies (a mixture of basic knowledge about different
3According to the Monitoring of education markets and organizations (MEMO), NRU HSE. Report in
Russian.
4The main dataset uses 2012 cohort of students, details are described in the next subsection
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aspects of society: philosophy, sociology, social psychology, law, political science) and
Foreign language in addition to the mandatory results in Mathematics and Russian. A
second way to enter some universities is via regional and national level Olympiads. These
Olympiads are subject-specific and considered to be more sophisticated than the school
exams, so they are designed to attract more talented students. The university under
consideration accepts the winners and prize-takers of these competitions without ex-
ams if the major of the Olympiads corresponds to the university department (Economic
Olympiads for economics department, Entrepreneurship Olympiads for management de-
partment etc.) or automatically given the highest score for the other subjects. However,
those students are still required to take the USE and have the scores not lower than the
required minimum (65 out of 100 in 2015, significantly lower than the requirement to be
accepted). The share of students entering universities via the Olympiads is around 5-6%
overall in Russia, but it is much higher for the university under consideration, around
40%, because of the selective status of the university. Therefore, in general, the group of
students entering HSE is more or less homogeneous and consists of the high-achievers.
Even though Nizhniy Novgorod branch of HSE is less selective than the main Moscow
branch, the level of the admitted students is still very high. The list of all accepted
students is publicly available in the university itself as well as on the website.
Usually, universities in Russia have an exogenous group formation. The students are
randomly split into groups of 20-30 people before the beginning of the studies. Students
rarely know their their new classmates before the group is formed, hence, almost all
links are newly formed in the study groups. These groups stay mainly intact for the
first three years. Several groups or even all students attend lectures together, whereas
each group has separate tutorials. Changes to the group structure may occur if many
students leave the university and the group becomes too small. Most of the universities
have by now adopted the Bologna Process model of 4 years for Bachelor’s degree and
1-2 years of Master’s degree. In most universities each academic year has 2 terms with
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exams periods after each. But HSE has 4 terms per year, with some exams or pass-fail
exams after the 1st and the 3rd term and with most exams after the 2nd and the 4th
term. The student is not allowed to fail more than two exams per half-year (1+2 or
3+4 term) and retakes are conducted only after the 2nd and 4th exam periods of each
year. All results of all students are publicly available near the students’ office in the
university and online so that everybody can follow their own performance, compare to
the peers, and the tuition students can understand, whether they are eligible for the
tuition discount.
3.2 Data description
The dataset includes the administrative and network information for the 2012 cohort
of HSE, Nizhny Novgorod. Students from Economics, Management, Law and Computer
Science are surveyed at the end of each study year, but before the final round of exam-
inations. The first year survey has 320 participants, the second - 296. Students were
asked to indicate their friends in the same cohort. The setup has long intervals between
the survey waves. This allows capturing more persistent trends of network dynamics,
although the failures of examinations during the first three terms of the year before the
network is observed may have a spillover effect on the last term’s examination grades.
The data also provide information from administrative records on all exam results,
retakes and dropouts, as well as some personal data: gender, high school examination
results, type of living (dormitory or not, dorm mates for those who live in the dormi-
tory), parental education, some indicators of willingness to succeed or efforts (time spent
on homework, time spent online on social networks, indicator of having a job parallel to
studies).
The typical problems of self-reported data are present in the dataset. There are several
observations with partially missing information on the network links. These entries need
to be handled with care since they might suggest either the students without friends, in-
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dicating the antisocial behaviour, or the students that just skipped the questions, while
answering the questionnaire. 13 students have no friends links, however, two of those
provide an information about connections in the help networks, which could indicate the
antisocial behaviour of the students. There is no information on particular friends for
four more students, who just said they are friends with a lot of students, or even with
all students.
Sampling is of a slight concern as well. The survey has 320 observations out of 432
students that entered the four departments of the university in 2012, that gives approx-
imately 75-80% of the full population of students (Table 1). Some of the students have
indicated the link to somebody outside of the sample, which can lead to overestimation
of the importance of the observed links. However, the survey was conducted on several
occasions, during lecture periods, so those, who did not answer the survey, are likely to
attend the university only infrequently, and hence to have less influence on the other
students. Survey was administered at the end of the year before the last term’s exam,
some students not in the sample had dropped out earlier.
Insert Table 1 here
Table 1 also demonstrates an inability of the dataset to catch all the information
about the dropouts (only 40% are present in the sample) and their small amount in the
network, because interviews are conducted at the end of the year, and many students
are no longer continue their studies at that moment. Hence, the econometric analysis of
dropouts is implausible, and forces to study exam retakes instead.
Inability to observe the dropouts causes the existence of links not captured by the
survey. The friends’ dropout from the university potentially influences the future per-
formance of the student in the same way, as the retakes, and exclusion of those links
from the analysis may lead to the overestimating of the influence of the retakes. How-
ever, many students are failing at the very beginning of the studies, when the newly
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established links are less likely to be very tight. The dropouts later in the course of
studies are more likely to be predicted by the friends than the retakes, therefore, the
actual shock might be less significant. It is still possible that the final results are slightly
biased due to the missing links, but the bias are not likely to distort the results very
much.
The survey design on friendship networks changed over the waves of the survey. The
first wave asked for no more than seven friends and has seven lines for the names, which
was ignored by approximately 2% of the sample, the second wave did not put any re-
striction on the number of friends, although it has seven lines as well. This lead to
almost 50% of the students in the first period reporting exactly seven friends, whereas
only 10,3% of the students in the second period indicated the same number of friends,
and seven friends are the maximum of the second wave. The distribution of the number
of the friends is presented in Table A.15 of Appendix. The average and median number
of connections is 6 in the first year, whereas it is 4 in the second wave. It is likely,
that in the first wave some of the students had to restrict themselves to exactly seven
names, whereas some felt obliged to include more people than they are actually tightly
connected to, which may cause underestimation of the importance of some links and
overestimation of the others. Lower average number of friends in the second period may
be caused by particularities of the survey construction as well as by the real trends in
the network development.
3.3 Descriptive analysis
People often tend to connect based on similarities in their observed and unobserved
characteristics. Table 2 summarizes the findings on the affinity of the peers in the
network. Most friends are coming from the same group, more than 84% and almost all
5A.1 also have information on the distribution of number of friends from the similar survey with no
restriction on number of friends, conducted on the next year cohort. However, this survey is not
suitable for my analysis, and is only used for the comparison.
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friends are from the same department.
Females are more likely to connect to peers of the same gender, whereas males have
more diverse networks. Gender difference also exists in the probability of connecting to
the dormitory mates: males are more likely to connect. The share of the friends with
the same living conditions is, however, decreasing with time, suggesting that some other
characteristics matter more for creating and sustaining the links.
Future plans on average seem not to matter a lot for the link formation: friends with
the same plans for the future education are about 50% of the peers. This share could
probably be higher, if the students were asked about there plans later in the course of
their studies, and not during the first year. However, given the student’s plans to pursue
a Master’s degree, her peers are as well more oriented on continuing the studies after
the Undergraduate level.
Insert Table 2 here
Table 3 summarizes the findings on the number and shares of friends with retakes in
both waves. More than 1/3 of all links in the first wave are links to students with retakes
(37%). The share of the links to students with retakes in the first period in the total
amount of second wave links is slightly smaller: 33%. It might be caused by the intention
of students to improve their peer group and connect to peers with higher outcomes. The
average amount of the friends with retakes in the first period is 1.83 while it is lower
for the second period: only 1.25. The average amount of peers with exam retakes for
the subsample of all students that have at least one peer with retake is higher than
the average of the full sample and is equal to 2.5. For the same students in the second
wave, the average number of peers who had exam retakes in the first period is now
much lower: 1.55. It can be suspected that the decrease in this value may be partially
explained by the readjustments of the network towards better connections. Moreover,
for the same subsample, the average number of peers with retakes in the second period
is even lower: 1.37. However, the difference between two periods is also determined by
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the decreased average number of friends, as well as dropouts of the students with the
worst performance.
Some of those, who didn’t have any friends with retakes in the first period, connected
to new peers that had the retakes in the second period, the average number of such
friends is only 0.35 though, but the average number of friends with retakes in the next
period is 0.57. So the changes in the network are leading to the improvements as well
as worsening of the new peer group.
Insert Table 3 here
Table 4 highlights that students in the studied framework tend to connect to peers,
having higher average grades than the students themselves, for the full sample as well
as for the samples with and without retake friends. Students, who do not connect to
peers with retakes, are performing better than those, whose friends are having retakes.
This suggests the existence of peer effects, since the better students tend to connect with
the peers with similar performance. The improvements in the performance in the future
are not significant, with the changes in the performance of the students without peers’
retakes being slightly higher.
Insert Table 4 here
It is not possible to distinguish between the predicted and unexpected components
of retakes by simply looking at the data. Therefore, the deeper econometric analysis
is needed to make conclusions about the existence and the magnitude of the effect of
unpredicted shock.
4 Model
Since a big share of the student’s failure can be explained by observed components of
the model, the failure should be treated as endogenous. To deal with arising identification
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issues, I am using the two-step model and estimation procedure proposed in Marchenko
(2018) to estimate the effect of friends’ failure on one’s future performance. It uses the
peer effect approach for the first period to capture the predictable component of the
probability of the failure and takes the remained unpredicted part to estimate the effect
of the shock on the future performance. The first step is as follows:
P (retakei) = α+ β
∑
j =i
G1ijy
1
j + γX
1
i + δ
∑
j =i
G1ijX
1
j + ξi + νi, E[νi|X1] = 0 (1)
where y1i and y
2
i are outcome variables of student i in the first wave and the second wave
correspondingly. I consider average grade as an outcome variable in the empirical part.
G1ij and G
2
ij are two adjacency matrices for the first and the second waves correspond-
ingly, weighted by the number of links, and their entries have the value of 1/ni if the
link from student i to student j exists. Note that these matrices are not necessarily
symmetrical, since the social network can be both directed (as in the empirical example)
or undirected.
Xi is a vector of individual characteristics that should be controlled for, such as gender,
city of origin, living conditions, some socioeconomic family characteristics, mandatory
unified high-school exam results, etc.
ξi - student-level unobserved fixed characteristics, which may influence students’ perfor-
mance and choice of connections. It consists of the common for individual’s connections
unobservable component and individual’s own unobserved fixed characteristics.
The unobserved individual characteristics also reflect homophily of the individuals,
which may influence both link formation and network outcomes. In the case of interac-
tions in the relatively big network, such as students’ network local differences, proposed
by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), may be used to deal with the presence of correlated effects,
together with the dynamic structure of the data. Both models with and without corre-
lated effects will be considered throughout the analysis.
16
If assumption of no correlated effects is made, 1 is transformed as follows:
P (retakei) = α+ β
∑
j =i
G1ijy
1
j + γX
1
i + δ
∑
j =i
G1ijX
1
j + νi (1a)
The second stage takes the average of the residuals of the equation (1) or (1a) (de-
pending on the assumptions about presence of correlated effects): URi =
∑
j =i G
1
ij νˆj ,
which is used as an unexpected component of the shock in the following equation:
∆yi = (α2 − α1) + β2
∑
j =i
G2ijy
2
j − β1
∑
j =i
G1ijy
1
j + δ˜URi + γ2X
2
i − γ1X1i +
+ δ2
∑
j =i
G2ijX
2
j − δ1
∑
j =i
G1ijX
1
j +∆i (2)
This equation is obtained as a difference between the one period linear-in-mean peer
effect on the level of GPA. The detailed discussion of the model is provided in Marchenko
(2018).
δ˜ is the desired effect. It captures the influence of the unpredicted component of the
friends’ retakes on the changes in one’s own performance.
Model in differences gives a better interpretation of the studied effect, additional to
the elimination of individual fixed effect. It estimates the changes of student’s perfor-
mance in response to the failure of the friends additional to the changes of performance
in comparison to the classmates, obtained by the single-period model.
Note that the coefficients for the endogenous peer effect and exogenous characteristics
are considered to be different in two periods: β2 and β1 and δ2 and δ1. Students may
experience different magnitude of the effects depending on how advanced they are in
their studies, how well they are adjusted to the university environment, etc. Moreover,
this also allows to take into account the changes in the network, since the students are
experiencing the influence of two different peer groups in two periods.
The setting of the paper suggests the possible existence of the correlated effects that
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appear due to the similar individual characteristics within a subgroup, as most of the
connections are formed inside of the same department, or even inside of the same exoge-
nously formed study group. I conduct my analysis for both models with and without
correlated effects. All the necessary modifications for the former are applied as proposed
in Marchenko (2018).
I am applying the 2SLS estimation procedure of Marchenko (2018) in both of the
stages with the friends’ of the friends characteristics of both periods as instruments.
5 Network characteristics
Marchenko (2018) proves that the identification of the effect of friends’ failures on the
future performance is achieved under following assumptions:
1a) existence of intransitive triads in the network at all points in time, i.e. the existence
of a set of three individuals i, j, k such that i is influenced by j, j is influenced by
k, but i is not influenced by k.
1b) for the model with correlated effects there exist paths of length 3 in the network at
all points in time, i.e. the existence of a set of four individuals i, j, k, l such that i
is influenced by j, j is influenced by k, k is influenced by l, but i is not influenced
by k and l directly, and j is not influenced by l.
2) existence of the exogenous changes of the friendship network, i.e. the changes not
caused by the failure of the friend.
All of the assumptions are valid for most networks, in particular, for the sample analysed
in this paper, which is discussed later in this section.
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5.1 Network stability
First, I discuss the variation in the network structure, on which the identification of
the second step relies heavily. It is important that some changes in the network are
exogenous, which is guaranteed by the natural processes of adjusting the friends circle:
students are likely to learn more about their classmates with time, and the friendships,
created during the first year, are often unstable.
Figure 1 visualizes the whole networks for the first wave (left) and for the second wave
(right). Red nodes are females, blue - males, the size of the nodes is proportional to the
overall degree of the node. It can be observed from this figure that two networks differ.
For example, two clusters in the bottom part of the graph are not connected in the first
wave, whereas there are several edges between them in the second wave.
More formal evidence about the variability of the network is presented in Table 5.
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(b) Wave 2.
Figure 1: Networks.
Quite a lot of variation can be observed: around 11-12% of the students reported exactly
the same set of friends. However, the share of completely new individual networks varies
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with gender. Females have only 5% of completely new set of friends. Hence, females
tend to be more persistent in forming and retaining the links.
Insert Table 5 here
Table 6 provides more evidence of the network variation: only around 16% of the links
survived after the first period, and around 78% of the links formed in the second period
are new.
Insert Table 6 here
5.2 Transitivity
Now I provide evidence of the existence of intransitive triads.
Table 6 describes several characteristics of the networks in the sample. The transitivity
is measured by the shares total amount of connected triangles in the whole graph. So in
more than 50% of all possible sets of three students, at least, one link is missing.
Figure2 shows the subgraph of the network to demonstrate the existence of in-
transitive triads in both of the samples. For example, in wave 1 the following triad is
intransitive: 717 → 694, 694 → 779, but 717  779. Other examples of intransitive
triads are: 939→ 693→ 778, 693→778→ 878 in the first wave and 939→ 779→ 694,
779→ 694→ 717 in the second wave, and some more.
The characteristics of the networks (see Table6) also clearly suggest that the network
is directed and cannot be assumed to be indirected since only around 60% of the links
are reciprocal. Also, the networks are sparse with the density of the links around 1.5%.
6 Results
6.1 Main specification
I use the following variables for the main specification of the model:
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Figure 2: Subgraph of the network
Outcome: average weighted grade of the student in the corresponding period. The
grades are summed up weighted by the amount of the credits assigned to the
particular course.
Retakes: indicator of at least one retake in the first period.
Initial ability, measured as the sum of mandatory Unified State Examinations (math-
ematics and Russian) plus the sum of cross-products between these USE results
and a dummy of winning any relevant Olympiads.
Controls: time-invariant, such as gender, socio-economic background like a dummy of
parental higher education, a dummy of having a single parent before entering the
university and dummy for siblings; and a set of dummies for three departments
with law department serving as a base.
Controls: time-varying, such as tuition, which is mostly time-invariant, but some rare
students change the type of tuition, working status (dummy for not working versus
any type of job) and living conditions (dormitory versus everything else).
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Descriptive statistics for these variables is provided in Table 7. It can be observed
that the average changes in the time-variant variables are rather modest, as well as the
changes in the performance. However, the average grade has higher standard deviation
and spread in the second period.
Insert Table 7 here
Table 8 summarizes some of the findings of the estimation of the model without cor-
related effects. Note that the sample size is smaller than was discussed in the data
description, due to the absence of some students in one of the waves. And it is critical
to have the information in both waves for each of the students to estimate the effect.
Insert Table 8 here
It can be observed that for the full sample the estimator of the effect of the unpre-
dicted component of retakes is negative but in most specifications insignificant. The
magnitude of the effect in specification (5) suggests that if a friend of some student had
a retake during the first year, which this student couldn’t predict at all, the difference
between the average grade in year 2 and the average grade in year 1 of the student will
be on average 0.05-0.39 lower, than in the case the student expected the retake of a
friend, depending on the total number of friends. For example, the median student on
average improves her grades in the second period relative to the first by 0.24, which is
2.4% of the maximum grade. The presence of unpredicted retake of the friend, other
things equal, may leave the average grade in the second year at the same level or even
decrease it up to 1.5% of maximum grade, changing the direction of the dynamics and,
moreover, putting the student on average 5-25 positions lower in the overall students’
rating, falling lower with less friends.
Note, that there is a highly significant difference between the economics and other
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departments for most of the specifications. On average, students of economics depart-
ment have -0.5 lower difference of grades, which suggest the overall lower grades of the
economics department in the second year. This evidence indicates the necessity of using
the model with correlated effects or treating the departments separately by splitting the
full sample.
Discussing the results for those, who had their own retakes, versus those, who did not
is the other possible way to improve the estimation results.
The further analysis is given in the next subsections, where I present the estimation
results in the subsamples, of the model with correlated effects, as well as the estimation
with a possibly improved network. However, it is worth pointing out, that the sample
size for the main specification is 250 students, which may be not sufficiently big to cap-
ture the desired effect, and the results of the estimation in the subsamples should be
treated with even more care, since with the lower sample size the asymptotic properties
of the proposed estimator may suffer.
6.2 Connection to one’s own retake
I first report the results for the subsamples of students with and without own retakes.
It can be suggested that students who had their own retake may, in general, be connected
to worse peers. Therefore, having friends with retakes might lower the performance even
further, whereas the friends’ retakes are more likely to have either no effect or even
positive influence for the better students.
Insert Table 9 here
Table 9 gives hints that the outcomes are influenced differently by the peers in case
of presence of one’s own retake and in the case when the student passed all the exams
from the first attempt. First of all, unexpected retake has an insignificant and negative
effect of higher magnitude in case of own retake than without own retakes. So, when
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students in the network have retakes together, they will less likely improve in the future.
It may be partially explained by the worse peer group, and partially by the fact that
fewer friends are able to help to catch up with the courses after retakes. It can also be
observed that the endogenous effect changes the sign, from negative to positive, and is
more significant for students with own retakes, which may suggest that the students,
especially the ones with their own retake tend to seek for the better peers in the future.
However, the data does not provide evidence that the willingness to connect to better
peers is coming from the discussed shock, therefore, the changes may be considered as a
natural learning process.
6.3 Effects in different departments
In this subsection, I discuss the results for subsamples of different departments. I
present the results for two departments: economics and management. The economics
department showed significantly different results in comparison to the others in the main
specification, and the management department is quite similar to the economics in the
curriculum and direction of study.
Insert Table 10 here
As can be seen from Table 10, the discussed effect is surprisingly different for two
departments. While specification (1) for the economic department have the negative
effect of the unexpected retake, the same effect in the specifications for management is
positive. However, estimators are not significant. Both subsamples have a small number
of observations, which can cause the low significance of the effect of the interest, and the
results should be treated with caution. It is possible to eliminate the differences between
the departments and estimate the full sample, by exploring the model with correlated
effects.
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6.4 Estimation in presence of correlated effects
In this Subsection, I would like to discuss the results of the estimation proposed in
Section 2.4.2. Simple estimation in the presence of correlated effects might lead to the
biased results. Next table presents the summary of results, judging from which I can
then compare the two specifications: with and without correlated effects.
Insert Table 11 here
Controlling for correlated effects leads to more significant and persistent value of
negative effect of unexpected retakes than in the main specification. The magnitude
of the effect in specification (5) suggests that if a friend has a retake during the first
year, which the student couldn’t predict at all, this will make the difference between the
average grade of year two and the average grade of year one for this student on average
0.46 lower, if the student has only 1 friend, and approximately 0.065 lower, if the student
has 7 friends. The maximum of the grades is 10 so that the person lose almost 5% of
the maximum grade when the network includes friends with retakes.
6.5 Additional analysis
6.5.1 Improving network
As it was mentioned before, students were asked to name up to 7 friends from their
cohort, although some named more than 7. However, it is reasonable to assume that all
named friends are not equal for the person. I introduce two possible ways to account for
better friends so that the quality of the network can be improved.
First, I assume that the friends named among the first are more important than the
others, since they were remembered earlier, and the best friends can’t be named last. I
reduced the network, only taking up to three named first students. I conducted analysis
for both models with and without accounting for correlated effects. The suggested im-
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provement of the network didn’t, however, increased the significance of the results6. The
effect of an unpredicted component of friends’ exam retake is not significantly different
from zero. Therefore, it might be reasonable to conclude that the unexpected negative
or positive performance of the whole network of friends is more important for the future
performance of students than the performance of only best friends.
Second, I observe that about 60% of the network is reciprocal, so I conduct similar
analysis limiting the network to only reciprocal connections. This again does not bring
any improvement in terms of the significance of the studied effect. It seems that the
students’ performance is shaped not only by their mutual friends, but although by those,
who don’t consider them as friends, but are considered as friends by the students. These
students may be viewed as a sort of role models, and therefore, are important to be
taken into account.
Thus, the initial full network is able to capture the effect of unexpected shock better
than the versions of the network, considered initially as possible improvements.
6.5.2 Important classes
The further analysis divides the subjects, studied by the students in the sample, into
two parts: more important and less important. All subjects have the corresponding
amount of ECTS credits, from 0 to 8 with average around 2.5. For the analysis, I set the
threshold of 4 ECTS points. However, some subjects have several exams, for example,
Mathematical Analysis, and the weight of some of the exam in the series can be lower
than 4, but, at least, one exam has ECTS higher than 4. In these cases, I am including
all the exams of the series in the sample of important exams. This restricts the set of
the students with retakes to 2/3 of the initial set.
Table 12 provides the results of the analysis in the new setting for the model without
correlated effects.
6The detailed results are presented in Tables A.3, A.4 in Appendix
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Insert Table 12 here
It can be observed that a lot of the results resemble the results for the model with
all retakes, however, the effect of the unpredicted retake is more significant when only
important classes are taken into consideration. The sign of the estimator remains neg-
ative but it gains much more significance, suggesting the different effect that different
classes may have on the future performance of the network. The results also suggest the
higher magnitude than in the initial model. Now, the friend’s unexpected retake of the
important class may make the difference between average grades in two periods bigger
and reduce the average grade of the second year additionally by up to 0.5, which equals
to 5% of the maximum grade.
This result is expectable. For example, the new set of retakes does not include the
class of Discrete Mathematics in the Economics department but includes Mathematical
Analysis. These two classes differ not only in the amount of ECTS but also in the length
and importance for the further classes. Mathematical Analysis is studied throughout the
whole length of the first year, whereas Discrete Mathematics only for one term. More-
over, the former introduces a lot of methods used later in the core classes of the higher
years, such as Micro or Macro, while the latter might be considered to contribute less in
future studies. The full list of classes, which were retaken at least once and the subset
of more important classes are presented in Table A.5 of Appendix.
The significance of a dummy of the Economics department suggests that the model
with correlated effects may be used, as in the model with the full set of retakes. Surpris-
ingly, the estimator of the effect of the unexpected retake in the model with correlated
effects loses the significance once I restrict the set of the retakes.
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6.6 Model validity
6.6.1 Predictability
The first step of the model predicts the probability of having the retake for each
student. This prediction is made by fellow students. The model is, therefore, operating
under the assumption that the students can predict the probability of the friends’ retakes
the same way the econometricians can. However, this assumption is not necessarily true.
On the one hand, the students may now more about their friends’ everyday life, personal
characteristics and psychological mood than the econometricians. On the other hand,
the students are likely not to have all the information about all the friends’ friends, and
their characteristics.
I check the alternative model specification, assuming no knowledge about the friends’
friends on the first step. Only student’s own characteristics are used to predict the
probability of the retakes. The residuals obtained from the main model and from the
simplified model have a similar distribution, however, they tend to differ for many of
the observations, which leads to insignificant results on the second step. If one believe
in the existence of discussed effect of the shock, this additional analysis suggests that
the information about the connection is crucial for the analysis, hence, the initial model
should be used.
6.6.2 Comparison on the threshold
In many cases, the difference between the students, who fail the exam and who pass
the exam with the minimal possible grade is almost negligible. The students on both
sides of the passing threshold often have the similar level of abilities and knowledge, and
the failure of the exam at the end could depend on simple luck. The sample of students,
who were close to failing the exam, can provide some additional evidence of the retakes’
importance, as shocking events.
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I repeat the main analysis, substituting the probability of obtaining the retake with
the probability of getting 4 on the first step. If only the performance of the friends
mattered, the effect of unpredicted part of the probability of getting 4 on the changes
in the friends’ future performance would be similar to the effect discussed in the paper.
However, none of the specifications reveal the significant effect. The mistake in predicting
the friends’ exam passing probability does not influence the future performance, whereas
the unpredicted retakes’ probability on average decreases the friends’ future performance.
Hence, the true abilities of the friends, revealed in the grades, matter little in comparison
to the fact of unexpected failure.
7 Conclusion
The influence of social connections on the performance of the peers is studied in
many fields and is of particular importance in the economics of education. Most of
the existing literature, however, studies the direct peer effect on performance, that is
the instantaneous influence of the peers’ performance. This paper chooses a different
approach and looks at the deferred effect of the peers’ outcomes, represented by the
changes of the performance in response to the failure of the friends one period before. I
discuss the spread of the unpredicted shock across the network of friends in the university
environment using the newly introduced in Marchenko (2018) dynamic peer effect model
in the presence of endogenous shock.
I take an advantage of both the structure of the network data and its dynamic nature.
These features allow to guarantee the identification of the effect of the friends’ exam
failures. First, the presence of intransitive triads allows using the friends of the friends
characteristics (or friends of the friends of the friends in model with correlated effects)
as instruments for the friends’ outcomes to deal with the possible simultaneity of the
peers’ influence. Variation of the network data, assuming that some of it is happening
not due to the exam failures, allow the model to capture the changes in the network
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effect that is happening due to the failured.
Failured exams are important in determining the future of a student. Even when
the student is allowed to stay in the university after failing the exam, accumulating the
failures may highly likely result in dropping out of the university. However, a failure may
influence not only the students with a failure but also the whole network of friends, as
proven in the paper. In most cases, the effect is not large, but still should not be ignored
by universities and researchers. When the threshold of failing the exam is too high, some
students, viewed by their friends as high-achievers, are likely to fail too. This anticipation
mistake leads to the decrease of the average grades of the whole friendship network. The
evidence provided in this paper suggests that the unpredicted exam retakes of the friends
will have a negative effect on the changes of the future performance of students. This
effect is especially prominent when only the more important and relevant exams are
included into the consideration.
The results of the paper rely on the particular institutional environment, and cannot
be extended to the more general university framework without additional analyses of
each particular case. Nevertheless, they should serve as an indication of the importance
of taking the social network into account, when discussing the consequences of individual
exam failures and establishing the thresholds for passing the examination.
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Tables
Table 1: Comparison of survey participants and population of students
Sample All students Share
I, year 1
Size 320 432 74.07%
Retake of at least one exam 157 203 77.34%
Dropouts 16 40 40 %
I, year 2
Size 296 393 75.32%
Retake of at least one exam 148 190 77.89%
Dropouts 24 39 62.54%
Note: interviews were conducted at the end of each year of studies
Table 2: Characteristics of reported network links by sex
Variables
1st wave 2nd wave
Male Female All Male Female All
Average size 4.53 5.19 4.96 3.57* 4.18* 3.93*
Average size including out of sample links 5.22 5.78 5.58 4.29* 4.96* 4.69*
Study group/department relation (% of network partners)
Same study group 84.17 87.23 86.76 87.21 89.89 88.78
Same department 98.54 99.21 98.99 97.54 99.39 98.95
Individual characteristics of network partners(% of network partners)
Same gender 64.05 81.97 76.18
Same working status 62.43 70.33 67.78 50.74 60.95 56.41
Same education of mother 61.75 66.84 65.19 - - -
Same education of father 56.45 50.08 52.14 - - -
Same living conditions 57.59 46.71 50.23 50.97 39.61 43.33
Same living conditions (dorm/not) 84.14 76.23 78.79 74.27 70.55 72.16
Future plans (% of network partners)
Same plans for Master 54.44 57.37 56.41 - - -
Same plans for Doctorate 47.18 47.32 47.27 - - -
Subsample of planning to do Master:
Share of friends planning to do Master 68.34 72.42 74.46 - - -
*the network data in the 2nd wave is truncated at 7 friends
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Table 3: Distribution of friends with retakes
Links formed in wave 1 2 2
Retakes in wave 1 1 2
Share of retakes links in all links 36.99% 32.99% 29.15%
Average number of friends with retakes 1.83 1.25 1.15
Subsample of students with at least one friend with retake in wave 1
Average number of friends with retakes 2.5 1.55 1.37
Subsample of students without friends with retakes in wave 1
Average number of friends with retakes 0 0.35 0.57
Table 4: Average grades in samples and subsamples
Full sample With retakes of friends No retakes of friends
Average grade
7.04 6.98 7.37
(0.99) (0.96) (0.98)
Average grade of friends
7.18 7.03 7.68
(0.65) (0.63) (0.49)
Sample size 320 234 86
Average grade next period
7.13 7.02 7.44
(1.14) (1.15) (1.07)
Sample size 297 217 80
Note: the highest grade is 10, the lowest is 1, the lowest passing grade is 4.
38
Table 5: Overlap of network partners between wave 1 and wave 2 (in % of total number
of individual networks)
Network statistics Full sample Male Female
Complete overlap 11.49 11.21 11.89
No new links 24.66 22.43 26.49
Partial overlap 65.20 46.73 77.30
Complete turnover 12.16 24.30 5.41
Observations 296 107 185
Note: Percentages of 1st, 3rd, and 4th rows do not add up to 100%, because there are new observations
in the 2nd wave, for which we do not observe the network in the 1st wave
Table 6: Some network characteristics
Network statistics Definition 1 year 2 year
Average indegree Average number of ingoing ties 4.96 (2.73) 3.93 (2.53)
Average outdegree Average number of outgoing ties 4.96 (2.01) 3.93 (2.2)
Density Proportion of existing ties in the
network
0.015 0.014
Reciprocity Proportion of ties which are re-
ciprocated
0.639 0.636
Transitivity The ratio of the triangles and the
connected triples in the graph
0.454 0.443
Share of the links that remained from the 1st wave
in total amount of links of the 2nd wave
- 22.61%
Share of the links that remained from the 1st wave
in total amount of links of the 1st wave
16.57% -
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Average grade, wave 1 7.20 0.94 4.58 9.35
Average grade, wave 2 7.23 1.13 4.50 9.86
Retakes (dummy) 0.33 0.47 0 1
Retakes (number) 0.684 1.25 0 6
Ability 183.6 70.09 106 355
Gender (female) 0.67 0.47 0 1
Tuition, wave 1 (private=1) 0.18 0.38 0 1
Tuition, wave 2 (private=1) 0.184 0.39 0 1
Economics department 0.328 0.47 0 1
Management department 0.272 0.45 0 1
Computer Science department 0.26 0.44 0 1
Working status, wave1 (not working=1) 0.804 0.39 0 1
Working status, wave2 (not working=1) 0.74 0.44 0 1
Higher Education of mother 0.796 0.4 0 1
Higher Education of father 0.624 0.49 0 1
Single parent family 0.2 0.40 0 1
Family with more than 1 kid 0.54 0.50 0 1
Living conditions, wave 1 (dormitory=1) 0.16 0.37 0 1
Living conditions, wave 2 (dormitory=1) 0.172 0.38 0 1
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Table 8: Estimation of main specification, dependent variable: change of the average
student grade
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.1521 -0.1840 -0.0482
Unexpected Retake -0.2638 -0.2143 -0.3077• -0.2064 -0.3907*
Endogenous effect, period 1 -0.0307 -0.0425 -0.0317 0.0908* 0.0614*
Endogenous effect, period 2 0.0205 0.0085 0.0218 0.0419 0.0306
Time-variant own exogenous characteristics
Tuition, w1 0.0208 0.0102
Tuition, w2 -0.0912 -0.1518
Working status, w1 -0.0664 -0.0719 -0.0716
Working status, w2 0.1381• 0.1147* 0.1346•
Living in dorm, w1 0.1061
Living in dorm, w2 0.1651
Friends’ exogenous characteristics
Economics, w1 0.2417 0.1568 0.2692 -0.0732
Economics, w2 -0.4681** -0.4367** -0.4513** -0.5893***
Management, w1 0.5409* 0.5712*
Management, w2 0.1790 0.1996
Working status, w1 -0.7352* -0.5420**
Working status, w2 -0.0497 -0.1903
HE of father, w1 0.4010•
HE of father, w2 0.0006
Sample size 250 250 250 250 250
BIC -216.68 -225.24 -226.51 -225.79 -196.71
*** - p-value < 0.01, ** - p-value < 0.05, * - p-value < 0.1, • - p-value < 0.15
41
Table 9: Estimation in subsamples of students with and without their own retake
Variable (1), yes (2), yes (1), no (2), no
Constant 0.2602 0.1027 -0.1001 -0.3734*
Unexpected Retake -0.2092 -0.1788 0.0246 0.0586
Endogenous effect, period 1 -0.0237 -0.0539 0.0352 -0.0262
Endogenous effect, period 2 0.0756** 0.0671• 0.0429 0.0577•
Time-variant own exogenous characteristics
Tuition, w1 -0.1612 0.0032
Tuition, w2 -0.1834 -0.2685
Working status, w1 -0.1175 -0.0713
Working status, w2 0.1379 0.1192
Friends’ exogenous characteristics
Economics, w1 -0.1964 -0.0474 0.0616 0.1081
Economics, w2 -0.9973*** -0.9131*** -0.3932 -0.5344•
Management, w1 0.3098
Management, w2 -0.0338
Working status, w1 -0.5632**
Working status, w2 -0.2305
HE of father, w1 0.6306• 0.3753
HE of father, w2 -0.3627 -0.4972•
Dummy siblings, w1 0.7689***
Dummy siblings, w2 0.2113
Sample size 83 83 167 167
BIC -336.10 -348.14 -288.34 -290.82
*** - p-value < 0.01, ** - p-value < 0.05, * - p-value < 0.1, • - p-value < 0.15
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Table 10: Estimation in subsamples of students in economics and management depart-
ments
Variable (1), Econ. (2), Econ. (3), Man. (4), Man.
Constant -0.5228* -0.2265 0.5614* 0.7032**
Unexpected Retake -0.4375 -0.4794 0.4043 0.3943
Endogenous effect, period 1 -0.0426 -0.0150 0.2884*** 0.3927***
Endogenous effect, period 2 0.0334 0.0544 0.1635** 0.2164**
Time-variant own exogenous characteristics
Tuition, w1 0.2538 -0.4889
Tuition, w2 -0.0479 -0.7778*
Working status, w1 -0.0888 0.0054
Working status, w2 0.2119 0.0880
Friends’ exogenous characteristics
Ability, w1 -0.0056* -0.0062**
Ability, w2 -0.0049** -0.0048**
Gender, w1 1.0102*
Gender, w2 0.2889
Working status, w1 -0.6228 -0.6353*
Working status, w2 -0.5707 -0.4209
HE of mother, w1 -0.4308 -0.7535*
HE of mother, w2 -0.3144 -0.5867*
Dormitory, w1 -1.5248*** -0.8094•
Dormitory, w1 -0.9558** -0.8145*
Dummy siblings, w1 0.4005
Dummy siblings, w2 -0.3945
Sample size 82 82 68 68
BIC -305.45 -300.61 -456.68 -471.57
*** - p-value < 0.01, ** - p-value < 0.05, * - p-value < 0.1, • - p-value < 0.15
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Table 11: Estimation of specification with correlated effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unexpected Retake -0.4144• -0.3899• -0.3817• -0.3817• -0.4616*
Endogenous effect, period 1 -0.0361 -0.0526 -0.0378 -0.0379 0.0186
Endogenous effect, period 2 0.0143 0.0016 0.0544 0.0544 0.0461
Time-variant own exogenous characteristics
Tuition, w1 0.0834 0.0411
Tuition, w2 -0.1011 -0.1292
Working status, w1 -0.0382 0.0266 0.0411 0.0590
Working status, w2 0.1077 0.1355• -0.1292 0.0991
Living conditions, w1 -0.1323
Living conditions, w2 0.2102
Friends’ exogenous characteristics
HE of mother, w1 -0.6547 -0.5532 -0.5785 -0.5785 -0.6717
HE of mother, w2 -0.2011 -0.1541 -0.3396 -0.3396 -0.3875
HE of father, w1 0.5325 0.5789 0.4663 0.4663
HE of father, w2 -0.0167 0.0378 -0.0831 0.3817
Sample size 250 250 250 250 250
BIC -183.89 -185.56 -195.56 -192.25 -197.99
*** - p-value < 0.01, ** - p-value < 0.05, * - p-value < 0.1, • - p-value < 0.15
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Table 12: Estimation with retakes in courses with ECTS 4 and higher
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.2176 -0.1670 -0.2005
Unexpected Retake -0.4912** -0.5484*** -0.5158** -0.4907** -0.5564**
Endogenous effect, period 1 0.1072* -0.0211 -0.0160 0.1076* -0.0158
Endogenous effect, period 2 0.0378 0.0279 0.0284 0.0401 0.0307
Time-variant own exogenous characteristics
Tuition, w1 0.0417 0.0430 0.0530
Tuition, w2 -0.0861 -0.0575 -0.0830
Working status, w1 -0.0568 -0.0570 -0.0616
Working status, w2 0.1488* 0.1494* 0.1469*
Living conditions, w1 -0.0222 -0.2673
Living conditions, w2 0.0312 -0.1808
Friends’ exogenous characteristics
Economics, w1 -0.1032 0.1652 0.1257 -0.1129 0.1387
Economics, w2 -0.6177*** -0.5279** -0.5466** -0.6240*** -0.5411**
Management, w1 0.4322 -0.4049 0.4159
Management, w2 0.1209 0.1045 0.1127
Working status, w1 -0.8120* -0.8186**
Working status, w2 -0.0074 -0.0102
Sample size 250 250 250 250 250
BIC -215.86 -220.76 -220.81 -226.98 -230.99
*** - p-value < 0.01, ** - p-value < 0.05, * - p-value < 0.1, • - p-value < 0.15
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Appendix
Additional tables
Table A.1: Distribution of the number of friends in samples
# of friends Long study, wave 1 Long study, wave 2 Short study
0 17 5.29% 26 8.12 % 9 4.39 %
1 1 0.31% 14 4.37% 3 1.46 %
2 5 1.56% 34 10.62% 4 1.95 %
3 28 8.72% 39 12.19% 17 8.29 %
4 32 9.97% 56 17.5% 28 13.66 %
5 39 12.15% 55 17.19% 34 16.59 %
6 41 12.77% 39 12.19% 34 16.59 %
7 150 46.73% 33 10.31% 28 13.66 %
8 2 0.62% 0 0.00% 21 10.24 %
9 1 0.31% 0 0.00% 14 6.83 %
10 3 0.93% 0 0.00% 4 1.95 %
11 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 3 1.46 %
12 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.49 %
13 1 0.31% 0 0.00% 3 1.46 %
14 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2 0.98 %
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Table A.2: Unified State Exams statistics
Subject Number of participated Average grade
Mathematics 305 59.87
Russian 305 79.85
Biology 2 71.5
Chemistry 1 80
Computer Science 49 76.96
Economics 27 32.52
Foreign Language 272 70.64
Geography 4 67
History 78 70.94
Law 20 69.4
Literature 20 69.35
Orientalism 2 75
Physics 49 58.45
Social Studies 269 71.01
Note: the highest grade is 100.
47
Table A.3: Results for the model with reciprocal links and the model with best friends,
no correlated effects
Variable Recipr., (1) Recipr., (2) Best, (3) Best, (4)
Constant -0.2318• -0.3127**
Unexpected Retake 0.1320 -0.0097 0.0469 0.0768
Endogenous effect, period 1 0.0180 0.0111 0.0231 -0.0467**
Endogenous effect, period 2 0.0480* 0.0407* 0.0818*** 0.0215
Time-variant own exogenous characteristics
Tuition, w1 0.0317 -0.0771
Tuition, w2 -0.1547 -0.2518
Working status, w1 -0.0909 -0.1235
Working status, w2 0.1483* 0.1510*
Friends’ exogenous characteristics
Economics, w1 0.0778 -0.0214 0.0082 0.1953
Economics, w2 -0.4701** -0.5337** -0.4869** -0.4096**
Computer Science, w1 -0.4977**
Computer Science, w2 -0.3899•
Working status, w1 -0.2272 -0.1881
Working status, w2 -0.1623 -0.4340**
Siblings, w1 0.2611*
Siblings, w2 -0.0080
Sample size 250 250 250 250
BIC -224.67 -221.77 -221.41 -218.07
*** - p-value < 0.01, ** - p-value < 0.05, * - p-value < 0.1, • - p-value < 0.15
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Table A.4: Results for the model with reciprocal links and the model with best friends,
with correlated effects
Variable Recipr.,(1) Recipr.,(2) Best,(3) Best,(4)
Unexpected Retake -0.1212 -0.0913 0.0406 -0.1365
Endogenous effect, period 1 -0.0081 -0.1188 0.0235 -0.0404
Endogenous effect, period 2 0.0498 0.0016 0.0811 -0.0262
Time-variant own exogenous characteristics
Tuition, w1 0.0394 0.1946
Tuition, w2 -0.1933 -0.0608
Working status, w1 0.0296 -0.0248
Working status, w2 0.0493 0.1437
Friends’ exogenous characteristics
Abilities, w1 -0.0004
Abilities, w2 -0.0029
Tuition, w1 -0.5923 0.2977
Tuition, w2 -0.4462* 0.1171
Economics, w1 1.0059
Economics, w2 -0.2755
HE of mother, w1 -0.3578
HE of mother, w2 -0.2662
Single Parent, w1 -0.0083
Single Parent, w2 -0.1985
Siblings, w1 0.2174
Siblings, w2 0.1179
Sample size 250 250 250 250
BIC -191.02 -192.71 -189.98 -183.06
*** - p-value < 0.01, ** - p-value < 0.05, * - p-value < 0.1, • - p-value < 0.15
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Table A.5: List of classes with retakes in the sample
Class Department Total No. of retakes ECTS 4 and higher
Algebra Computer Science 21 No
Architecture of Computer
Systems
Computer Science 2 No
Architecture of ECM Computer Science 1 No
Basics of computer technology
and programming
Computer Science 3 Yes
Discrete Mathematic Computer Science 8 No
Discrete Mathematic Economics 2 No
Economic Theory and Institu-
tional Analysis
Management 28 (in 2 terms) Yes
Economic Theory and Institu-
tional Analysis
Computer Science 12 No
Economic Theory Basics Economics 27 (in 3 terms) Yes
Economics Computer Science 3 No
English and other languages All departments 9 No
Geometry and Algebra Computer Science 8 Yes
History of economic thoughts Economics 1 Yes
History of foreign state and
law
Law 2 Yes
Introduction to software engi-
neering
Computer Science 3 Yes
Judicial power and law en-
forcement
Law 1 No
Life safety All departments 3 No
Linear Algebra Economics 28 No
Mathematical Analysis Computer Science 68 (in 2 terms) Yes
Mathematical Analysis Economics 12 Yes
Mathematics Management 31 (in 2 terms) Yes
Methods of financial and eco-
nomic computations
Economics 1 No
Microeconomics Computer Science 18 (in 2 terms) Yes
Philosophy Management 6 Yes
Roman Law Law 1 No
Socio-Economic Statistics Economics 2 No
Sociology Management 1 Yes
Theoretical basics of com-
puter technology
Computer Science 9 (in 2 terms) No
Theory of state and law Law 4 Yes
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